The
extracts
below
are
from
the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute Yearbook
2025
‘World’s
nuclear arsenals being enlarged and upgraded ‘
'Nearly
all of the nine nuclear-armed states—the United States, Russia, the
United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Israel—continued
intensive nuclear modernisation programmes in 2024, upgrading
existing weapons and adding newer versions.
Of
the total global inventory of an estimated 12 241
warheads
in January 2025, about
9614
were in military stockpiles for potential use An estimated 3912 of
those warheads were deployed with missiles and aircraft and the rest
were in central storage. Around 2100 of the deployed warheads were
kept in a state of high operational alert on ballistic missiles.
Nearly all of these warheads belonged to Russia or the USA, but China
may now keep some warheads on missiles during peacetime.
Since
the end of the cold war, the gradual dismantlement of retired
warheads by Russia and the USA has normally outstripped the
deployment of new warheads, resulting in an overall year-on-year
decrease in the global inventory of nuclear weapons. This trend is
likely to be reversed in the coming years, as the pace of
dismantlement is slowing, while the deployment of new nuclear weapons
is accelerating.
‘The
era of reductions in the number of nuclear weapons in the world,
which had lasted since the end of the cold war, is coming to an end,’
said Hans M. Kristensen, Associate Senior Fellow with SIPRI’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme and Director of the Nuclear
Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS).
‘Instead, we see a clear trend of growing nuclear arsenals,
sharpened nuclear rhetoric and the abandonment of arms control
agreements.’
Russia
and the USA
together possess around 90 per cent of all nuclear weapons. The sizes
of their respective military stockpiles (i.e. useable warheads) seem
to have stayed relatively stable in 2024 but both states are
implementing extensive modernisation programmes that could increase
the size and diversity of their arsenals in the future. If no new
agreement is reached to cap their stockpiles, the number of warheads
they deploy on strategic missiles seems likely to increase after the
bilateral 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) expires in
February 2026.
The
USA’s
comprehensive nuclear modernisation programme is progressing but in
2024 faced planning and funding challenges that could delay and
significantly increase the cost of the new strategic arsenal.
Moreover, the addition of new non-strategic nuclear weapons to the US
arsenal will place further stress on the modernisation programme.
Russia’s
nuclear modernisation programme is also facing challenges that in
2024 included a test failure and the further delay of the new Sarmat
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and slower than expected
upgrades of other systems. Furthermore, an increase in Russia’s
non-strategic nuclear warheads predicted by the USA in 2020 has so
far not materialised.
Israel—which
does not publicly acknowledge possessing nuclear weapons—is also
believed to be modernising its nuclear arsenal. In 2024 it conducted
a test of a missile propulsion system that could be related to its
Jericho family of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Israel
also appears to be upgrading its plutonium production reactor site at
Dimona.
SIPRI
Director Dan Smith warns about the challenges facing nuclear arms
control and the prospects of a new nuclear arms race. Smith observes
that ‘bilateral nuclear arms control between Russia and the USA
entered crisis some years ago and is now almost over’. While New
START—the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty limiting
Russian and US strategic nuclear forces—remains in force until
early 2026, there are no signs of negotiations to renew or replace
it, or that either side wants to do so. US President Donald J. Trump
insisted during his first term and has now repeated that any future
deal should also include limits on China’s nuclear
arsenal—something that would add a new layer of complexity to
already difficult negotiations.
Smith
also issues a stark warning about the risks of a new nuclear arms
race: ‘The signs are that a new arms race is gearing up that
carries much more risk and uncertainty than the last one.’ The
rapid development and application of an array of technologies—for
example in the fields of artificial intelligence (AI), cyber
capabilities, space assets, missile defence and quantum—are
radically redefining nuclear capabilities, deterrence and defence,
and thus creating potential sources of instability. Advances in
missile defence and the oceanic deployment of quantum technology
could ultimately have an impact on the vulnerability of key elements
of states’ nuclear arsenals.
Furthermore,
as AI and other technologies speed up decision making in crises,
there is a higher risk of a nuclear conflict breaking out as a result
of miscommunication, misunderstanding or technical accident.'
https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/nuclear-risks-grow-new-arms-race-looms-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now
