Britain and Saudi Arabia, 1969/1971
22Dec13
‘Valuable as this export market [ie
Saudi Arabia] is, it is of less importance to us than Saudi Arabia’s
role in the preservation of our wider politico-economic interests in the
Middle East… King Feisal’s hostility to communism is as crude and
obsessive as the anti-westernism in some other Arab states: but it is
solidly based on a sound sense of where Saudi Arabian interests lie –
which happens to be where our own lie. The Saudi stand gives
encouragement to other Arab governments, and elements within other Arab
countries, who wish to resist the extension of Soviet and other
anti-western influences… A collapse of the Saudi regime, whether
followed by the substitution of some form of revolutionary government or
disintegration of the Saudi kingdom, could therefore cause damage far
wider than to our commercial interests here. It would leave other
non-revolutionary regimes – eg, Jordan, Libya and Kuwait – dangerously
exposed… There would be a serious danger of the trouble spreading to
other oil producing countries… From this.. it appears that our interests
would be best served by: (a) the survival of the present regime for at
least the next few years; (b) internal reform and some liberalisation to
give it a better chance of survival, and to make external policies more
effective and more appealing; (c ) some reinsurance for us against
possible change; (d) the continuation of Saudi Arabia’s present general
external policies and a more cooperative policy on the Gulf; (e)
anything which improves our commercial opportunities in the Saudi
market’.
‘Our narrow commercial interests are
of lesser importance than the politico-strategico-economic interest to
us of Saudi Arabia as a major supplier of oil to the West, owner of the
largest reserves of any country outside the United States and a major
factor in the stability of the whole Gulf oil-producing area. To a
degree, the stability of Saudi Arabia and that of the Gulf states are
interdependent. The Saud regime would be threatened by radical regimes
in the Gulf states; the present regimes in these states could hardly be
expected to survive a revolution in Saudi Arabia. Libya is a fearful
example. We can hope that when change comes in Saudi Arabia, it will be
less unpalatable and we can in a limited way reinsure against it by
extending non-political contacts outside the regime and the surrounding
establishment. But we should work on the assumption that, however
unsatisfactory, this is the best regime in Saudi Arabia we have, or can
count on getting. There is little or nothing we can do to improve it, so
we must make the best of what it is. It is in our interests that it
should survive for a few more years’.
By Mark Curtis from here
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