The 2011 famine in Somalia, which killed almost 260,000 people, was avoidable.
The famine early warning systems network (Fewsnet) and the food security nutrition and analysis unit (FSNAU) produced more than 70 early warning bulletins and a similar number of briefings with agencies and donor governments. Had the international community responded, early interventions could have been undertaken to shore up livelihoods and prevent the downward spiral into destitution and starvation. But these warnings fell on deaf ears. Donor governments failed to increase aid, and humanitarian agencies failed to increase their appeals. Only when famine was declared did the humanitarian system mobilise, by when the opportunity to avert disaster had passed.
Why was the Somalia famine was allowed to happen? The one word answer is politics.
The worst affected areas of Somalia were under the control of the Islamist group al-Shabaab, engaged in a war with the then Somali transitional federal government, itself supported by the west. Western donor governments were alarmed at the possibility of their aid being captured by an adversary. US legislation meant that humanitarians working in Somalia could have been liable to prosecution in the US and up to 15 years in prison should the aid they were distributing be diverted to al-Shabaab. These legal constraints were accompanied by onerous reporting requirements for agencies and their partners, and a significant decline in aid, which halved between 2008 and 2011. Western donors prioritised their geopolitical agendas above the humanitarian need to prevent famine.
By ignoring early warnings, withdrawing aid and constraining the ability of humanitarian organisations to operate in Somalia, western donors made famine more, not less likely. Donor antipathy meant humanitarian agencies concluded it would be politically unfeasible to raise their appeal as early warnings accumulated. It contributed to al-Shabaab's catastrophic decision to expel the UN's World Food Programme in 2010, and a further 16 UN agencies and international NGOs for "illicit activities and misconduct" the following year. Al-Shabaab subordinated the needs of the population under its control to its war against the TFG and its propaganda campaign against the west. Not only did al-Shabaab restrict humanitarian access and reject emergency aid, it also limited the movement of populations and taxed food production.
It was only when famine was declared that donor governments could no longer stand by as people starved without attracting criticism from domestic media and the public.
Aid structures remain highly politicised, far from neutral or impartial. Despite having the early warning systems and resources needed to prevent famine There are no rules for how early warnings should lead to early action, and a lack of clear processes for how decisions should be triggered, escalated and justified.
Taken from here
No comments:
Post a Comment